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Abstract—In this paper, we introduce the concept of two-way
coding, which originates in communication theory characterizing
coding schemes for two-way channels, into control theory, par-
ticularly to facilitate the analysis and design of feedback control
systems under injection attacks. Moreover, we propose the notion
of attack decoupling, and show how the controller and the two-
way coding can be co-designed to nullify the transfer function
from attack to plant, rendering the attack effect zero both in
transient phase and in steady state.
Index Terms—Cyber-physical systems, networked control sys-
tems, two-way channel, two-way coding, attack decoupling
I. INTRODUCTION
Observations on the underlying connections between com-
munication and control date back to [1], in which the au-
thors (including Shannon and Bode) stated that “there is an
obvious analogy between the problem of smoothing the data
to eliminate or reduce the effect of tracking errors and the
problem of separating a signal from interfering noise in com-
munications systems. In recent years, since the integrations of
communication and control systems are becoming more and
more prevalent, as witnessed in, e.g., cyber-physical systems
and IoT systems, the interaction of communication theory
(including information theory and coding theory) and control
theory has especially been a heated topic (see, e.g., [2] and
the references therein). In such interactions, concepts and tools
from communication such as entropy have been introduced
to control (see, e.g., [3]), and so are those from control to
communication, as in, for instance, [4].
In this paper, we introduce yet another notion from com-
munication to control: two-way coding in two-way commu-
nication. The concept of two-way communication channels
was proposed by Shannon [5]. As its name indicates, in
two-way channels, signals are transmitted simultaneously in
both directions between the two terminals of communication.
Accordingly, coding schemes for two-way channels should
utilize the information contained in the data streaming in both
directions. Stated alternatively, the coding schemes should also
be two-way, and thus are correspondingly referred to as two-
way coding [6]–[8].
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With the controller side and the plant side being respec-
tively viewed as the two terminals of communication, the
communication channels embedded in networked feedback
control systems are inherently two-way channels. However,
approaches based on two-way coding for the two-way channels
in networked feedback systems are rarely seen in the litera-
ture. One exception is the so-called scattering transformation
utilized in the tele-operation of robotics [9], although, as far as
we know, its connection with two-way coding has never before
been established. Nevertheless, scattering transformation can
be viewed in a broad sense as a special class of two-way
coding, aiming to resolve the issue of two-way time delays,
the most essential characterization and the main issue of the
two-way channels modeled on the input-output level in the
problem of tele-operation.
When it comes to cyber-physical security problems arising
in networked control systems (see, e.g., [10]–[21] and the
references therein), to the best of our knowledge, only one-
way coding has been employed. The authors of [22] introduced
one-way encryption matrices into control systems to achieve
confidentiality and integrity. In [23], the authors considered
using one-way coding matrices to encode the sensor outputs
in order to detect stealthy false data injection attacks in cyber-
physical systems. One-way modulation matrices were inserted
into cyber-physical systems in [24] to detect covert attacks and
zero-dynamics attacks. Dynamic one-way coding was applied
to detect and isolate routing attacks [25] and replay attacks
[26]. For remote state estimation in the presence of eaves-
droppers, the so-called state-secrecy codes were introduced
[27], which are also essentially one-way coding schemes.
Nevertheless, one-way coding has its inherent limitations;
for instance, one-way coding in general cannot eliminate the
unstable poles nor nonminimum-phase zeros of the plant nor
the controller [28], which are most critical issues in the defense
against, e.g., zero-dynamics attacks [13].
In our previous work [28], we examined how the presence of
two-way coding in linear time-invariant (LTI) feedback control
systems can make the zeros and/or poles of the equivalent
plant as viewed by the attacker all different from those of the
original plant, and under some additional assumptions (i.e., the
plant is stabilizable by static output feedback), the equivalent
plant may even be made stable and/or minimum-phase. In the
particular case of zero-dynamics attacks, it is then implicated
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Fig. 1. A networked feedback system with two-way coding.
that the attacks will be detected if designed according to the
original plant, while the attack effect may be corrected in
steady state if the attacks are to be designed with respect to
the equivalent plant.
To prevent possible damages during the transient phase even
when the attack affect can be corrected in steady state, in
this paper we propose the notion of attack decoupling. For
LTI systems, we say that a certain attack is decoupled if the
transfer function from attack to plant input/output is made
zero, without making zero the transfer function from reference
to plant input/output. As such, when attack decoupling is
achieved, the attack response will be completely zero both
in transient phase and in steady state. We then examine in
order conventional feedback systems, feedback systems with
one-way coding, as well as feedback systems with two-way
coding, and discover that it is only in feedback systems with
two-way coding that attacks in the uplink or downlink channels
can be decoupled.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II introduces the two-way coding. In Section III, we
propose the notion of attack decoupling. Concluding remarks
are given in Section IV.
II. TWO-WAY CODING
Consider the single-input single-output (SISO) system de-
picted in Fig. 1. Herein, K denotes the controller while P
denotes the plant. The reference signal is r (t) ∈ R and the
plant output is y (t) ∈ R. In addition, let u (t), u (t), y (t),
q (t), q (t), v (t), v (t) ∈ R.
Definition 1: The (static) two-way coding is defined as[
q (t)
y (t)
]
=M
[
u (t)
v (t)
]
, M =
[
a b
c d
]
. (1)
Herein, a, b, c, d ∈ R are chosen such that
ad 6= 0, ad− bc 6= 0. (2)
Strictly speaking, it should be further assumed that |ad− bc| <
∞.
Herein, two-way coding (that operates in a feedback loop)
represents a two-way transformation taking in the signal in
the forward path and the signal in the feedback path while
outputting a new signal to the forward path and a second new
signal that passes on in the feedback path. In comparison,
Fig. 2 depicts a system with one-way coding schemes, which
are one-way transformations that either take in the signal in
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Fig. 2. A networked feedback system with one-way coding.
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Fig. 3. A feedback system with two-way coding under injection attacks.
the forward path and output a new signal that passes on in
the forward path, or input the signal in the feedback path and
output a signal that continues in the feedback path; herein,
α, β ∈ R and 0 < |α| , |β| <∞.
For simplicity, we denote the inverse of two-way coding M
as [
a b
c d
]
=M−1 =
[
d
ad−bc − bad−bc
− cad−bc aad−bc
]
, (3)
where a, b, c, d ∈ R. As illustrated on the plant side in Fig. 1,
the inverse of two-way coding M denotes another two-way
coding.
A. Two-Way Coding in LTI Feedback Control Systems
We next analyze in particular LTI feedback control systems
with two-way coding. Consider the SISO feedback system
with two-way coding depicted in Fig. 3. Assume that herein
the controller K and plant P are LTI with transfer functions
K (s) and P (s), respectively. In addition, let r (t), u (t), u (t),
y (t), y (t), q (t), q (t), v (t), v (t) ∈ R. Meanwhile, suppose
that injection (additive) attacks w (t) ∈ R and z (t) ∈ R
exist in the forward path and feedback path of the control
systems, respectively. Let R (s), U (s), U (s), Y (s), Y (s),
Q (s), Q (s), V (s), V (s), W (s), Z (s) represent the Laplace
transforms, assuming that they exist, of the signals r (t), u (t),
u (t), y (t), y (t), q (t), q (t), v (t), v (t), w (t), z (t). From now
on, we assume that all the transfer functions of the systems
are with zero initial conditions, unless otherwise specified.
We now provide expressions [28] for the Laplace transforms
of the plant input u (t) and the plant output y (t), given
reference r (t) and under injection attacks w (t) and z (t).
Proposition 1: Consider the SISO feedback system with
two-way coding under injection attacks depicted in Fig. 3.
Assume that controller K and plant P are LTI with transfer
functions K (s) and P (s), respectively, and that the closed-
loop system is stable. Then,
U (s) =
K (s)
1 +K (s)P (s)
R (s) +
a−1 [1 + cK (s)]
1 +K (s)P (s)
W (s)
+
a−1 [b− (ad− bc)K (s)]P (s)
1 +K (s)P (s)
Z (s) , (4)
and
Y (s) =
K (s)P (s)
1 +K (s)P (s)
R (s) +
a−1 [1 + cK (s)]P (s)
1 +K (s)P (s)
W (s)
+
a−1 [b− (ad− bc)K (s)]P (s)
1 +K (s)P (s)
Z (s) . (5)
Proposition 1 lays the foundation for the analysis of attack
decoupling in feedback systems with two-way coding, as will
be discussed shortly.
III. ATTACK DECOUPLING
In what follows, we propose the notion of attack decoupling,
which features a strong notion of security in the context
of cyber-physical systems; in general, however, it is a more
broad control-theoretic notion applicable to any (networked)
feedback systems.
Definition 2: Consider a feedback control system. An at-
tack is said to be decoupled if the attack response in plant
input/output can be made completely zero for arbitrary attack
signals, without nullifying the reference response in plant
input/output.
For LTI systems, attack decoupling can be defined more
specifically in terms of transfer functions.
Definition 3: Consider an LTI feedback control system. An
attack is said to be decoupled if the transfer function from at-
tack to plant input/output can be made zero, without nullifying
the transfer function from reference to plant input/output.
When the attack is decoupled for a certain attack point, it
is as if the path from the attack signal to plant input/output
signal is cut off, while not cutting off the signal path from the
reference to plant input/output. In general, attack decoupling
is a system-theoretic notion, which is not restricted to dealing
with attacks and is more broadly applicable to disturbances
and noises. While within the scope of attack analysis, attack
decoupling is a strong notion of security, meaning that the
attack response will be completely zero both in transient phase
and in steady state for arbitrary injection attacks, regardless of
what the attacker knows or does.
As a matter of fact, attack decoupling is closely related
to the notion of disturbance decoupling in geometric control
[29]. More specifically, disturbance decoupling only requires
that the transfer function from the disturbance to plant output
to be zero, without requiring the transfer function from the
disturbance to plant input to be zero. In this sense, attack
decoupling implies and provides a new approach to achieve
disturbance decoupling, while bringing new perspectives to
other relevant topics in geometric control as well.
We next investigate, one by one, conventional feedback
systems, feedback systems with one-way coding, as well as
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Fig. 4. A feedback system without coding.
feedback systems with two-way coding, to see whether attack
decoupling is possible, and if so, how to achieve it.
A. Conventional Feedback Systems
In the sequel, we let Tur (s) , Tuw (s) , Tuz (s) denote the
transfer functions from R (s) ,W (s) , Z (s) to U (s), respec-
tively, and let Tyr (s) , Tyw (s) , Tyz (s) denote the transfer
functions from R (s) ,W (s) , Z (s) to Y (s), respectively. We
shall first show that or conventional feedback control systems
without coding, as depicted in Fig. 4, neither attack w (t) nor
attack z (t) can be decoupled.
Theorem 1: Consider the SISO feedback system depicted
in Fig. 4. Then, neither attack w (t) nor attack z (t) can be
decoupled.
Proof: For the system in Fig. 4, it can be obtained that
U (s) =
K (s)
1 +K (s)P (s)
R (s) +
1
1 +K (s)P (s)
W (s)
− K (s)
1 +K (s)P (s)
Z (s)
= Tur (s)R (s) + Tuw (s)W (s) + Tuz (s)Z (s) .
Clearly,
Tur (s) = K (s)Tuw (s) = −Tuz (s) .
As such, if Tuw (s) = 0 or Tuz (s) = 0, then Tur (s) = 0. In
other words, attack w (t) cannot be decoupled. Similarly, by
noting that
Y (s) =
K (s)P (s)
1 +K (s)P (s)
R (s) +
P (s)
1 +K (s)P (s)
W (s)
− K (s)P (s)
1 +K (s)P (s)
Z (s)
= Tyr (s)R (s) + Tyw (s)W (s) + Tyz (s)Z (s) ,
and that
Tyr (s) = K (s)Tyw (s) = −Tyz (s) ,
it follows that attack z (t) cannot be decoupled.
B. Feedback System with One-Way Coding
In the system in Fig. 5 with one-way coding, neither attack
w (t) nor attack z (t) can be decoupled.
Theorem 2: Consider the SISO feedback system depicted
in Fig. 5. Then, neither attack w (t) nor attack z (t) can be
decoupled.
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Fig. 5. A feedback system with one-way coding.
Proof: For the system in Fig. 5, it can be obtained that
U (s) =
K (s)
1 +K (s)P (s)
R (s) +
α−1
1 +K (s)P (s)
W (s)
− β
−1K (s)
1 +K (s)P (s)
Z (s)
= Tur (s)R (s) + Tuw (s)W (s) + Tuz (s)Z (s) .
Clearly,
Tur (s) = αK (s)Tuw (s) = −βTuz (s) .
As such, if Tuw (s) = 0 or Tuz (s) = 0, then Tur (s) = 0. In
other words, attack w (t) cannot be decoupled. Similarly, by
noting that
Y (s) =
K (s)P (s)
1 +K (s)P (s)
R (s) +
α−1P (s)
1 +K (s)P (s)
W (s)
− β
−1K (s)P (s)
1 +K (s)P (s)
Z (s)
= Tyr (s)R (s) + Tyw (s)W (s) + Tyz (s)Z (s) ,
and that
Tyr (s) = αK (s)Tyw (s) = −βTyz (s) ,
it follows that attack z (t) cannot be decoupled.
In fact, it can be shown that attack decoupling on neither
points is possible even with dynamic one-way coding α (s)
and β (s).
C. Feedback System with Two-Way Coding
For the system shown in Fig. 3 with two-way coding, attack
w (t) can be decoupled, and attack z (t) can be decoupled as
well.
Theorem 3: Consider the SISO feedback system depicted in
Fig. 3. Suppose that plant P (s) is stabilizable by static output
feedback, and that controller K (s) is chosen among such
static output-feedback stabilizing controllers, i.e., K (s) =
K ∈ R.
• If c = −1/K, then attack w (t) is decoupled;
• If b = (ad− bc)K, then attack z (t) is decoupled.
Proof: For the system in Fig. 3, it can be obtained that
(see Proposition 1)
U (s) =
K (s)
1 +K (s)P (s)
R (s) +
a−1 [1 + cK (s)]
1 +K (s)P (s)
W (s)
− a
−1 [b− (ad− bc)K (s)]
1 +K (s)P (s)
Z (s)
= Tur (s)R (s) + Tuw (s)W (s) + Tuz (s)Z (s) ,
and
Y (s) =
K (s)P (s)
1 +K (s)P (s)
R (s)
+
a−1 [1 + cK (s)]P (s)
1 +K (s)P (s)
W (s)
− a
−1 [b− (ad− bc)K (s)]P (s)
1 +K (s)P (s)
Z (s)
= Tyr (s)R (s) + Tyw (s)W (s) + Tyz (s)Z (s) ,
Clearly, when K (s) = K and c = −1/K, we have
1 + cK (s) = 1 + cK = 0,
and it follows that Tuw (s) = 0 and Tyw (s) = 0, while
Tur (s) 6= 0 and Tyr (s) 6= 0. In other words, attack w (t) is
decoupled. Similarly, when K (s) = K and b = (ad− bc)K,
we have
b− (ad− bc)K (s) = b− (ad− bc)K = 0,
and it follows that Tuz (s) = 0 and Tyz (s) = 0, while
Tur (s) 6= 0 and Tyr (s) 6= 0. In other words, attack z (t)
is decoupled.
Intuitively, in feedback systems without coding as well as
systems with one-way coding, there is only one feedback loop;
as such, if the path from the attack signal to plant input/output
signal is to be cut off, then the signal path from the reference
to plant input/output will inevitably also be cut off. On the
other hand, the presence of two-way coding brings additional
feedback loops into a feedback system, enabling, probably in
a subtle way, the cutting off of the path from the attack signal
to plant input/output signal without cutting off that from the
the reference to plant input/output.
Note that the attack decoupling of w (t) or z (t) requires the
co-design of the controller and the two-way coding, as well
as the sacrifice of control performance since controllers are
limited to be static output-feedback.
Note also that the conditions for achieving attack decoupling
do not involve the plant. In other words, attack decoupling will
not be affected by the inaccuracies/uncertainties in plant model
P (s).
It is clear that if attack w (t) (or z (t)) is decoupled, then its
attack response (for any injection attacks) will be zero in plant
input/output, even though the attacks may not be detected;
for instance, zero-dynamics attacks [13] at w (t) (or z (t))
cannot be detected if designed properly, but they will have
no influence on plant input/output when attack w (t) (or z (t))
is decoupled.
1) Control-theoretic implications of attack decoupling: We
now examine the implications of attack decoupling in control
systems. It is clear that when Tuw (s) = 0, its H∞ norm is
zero, that is,
‖Tuw (s)‖∞ = 0, (6)
and moreover, the corresponding Bode integral is given by
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
ln |Tuw (jω)|dω = −∞. (7)
This means perfect attack attenuation, and thus no limitations
(e.g., lower bound on H∞ norm [30]) or trade-offs (e.g., Bode
integral [30]) are present. Similar conclusions hold for the
cases when Tyw (s) = 0, Tuz (s) = 0, and Tyz (s) = 0 as
well.
2) Almost vs. exact attack decoupling: Strictly and prac-
tically speaking, for w (t), only “almost attack decoupling”
is possible; otherwise, algebraic loops will be present in the
feedback system. By “almost attack decoupling”, we mean
the attack signal can be attenuated to any degree of accuracy,
e.g., the H∞ norm of the corresponding transfer function
can be made arbitrarily close to zero; cf. almost disturbance
decoupling in [31]. In particular, (6) will then become
‖Tuw (s)‖∞ = , ∀ > 0, (8)
and (7) becomes
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
ln |Tuw (jω)|dω = ln ε, ∀ε > 0. (9)
Meanwhile, for z (t), “exact attack decoupling” (as defined in
Definition 2 and Definition 3) can be achieved. That is to say,
the following are still achievable:
‖Tuz (s)‖∞ = 0, (10)
and
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
ln |Tuz (jω)|dω = −∞. (11)
However, since almost attack decoupling will involve dynamic
K (s) and/or dynamic[
a (s) b (s)
c (s) d (s)
]
,
we leave the detailed discussions on this topic to future
research.
D. An “Impossibility Theorem”
In what has been presented in this paper so far, we only
considered the so-called “single-point” attacks, such as zero-
dynamics attacks [13], where attacks are injected into the
feedback system at only one point; in other words, one of
w (t) and z (t) is zero. In fact, “double-point” attacks, such as
covert attacks [16], where attacks are injected into the system
at two points simultaneously, have also been discussed in the
literature.
In the subsequent theorem, it will be shown that for double-
point attacks injecting attack signals w (t) and z (t) at the
same time (e.g., covert attacks [16]), the attacks w (t) and
z (t) cannot be decoupled simultaneously, and hence the attack
effect cannot be made completely zero for arbitrary double-
point attacks.
Theorem 4: In the SISO feedback system depicted in Fig. 3,
attack w (t) and attack z (t) cannot be decoupled simultane-
ously.
Proof: If plant P (s) is not stabilizable by static output
feedback, then neither attack w (t) nor attack z (t) can be
decoupled. Otherwise, if plant P (s) is stabilizable by static
output feedback, it is known from Theorem 3 that the decou-
pling of w (t) requires that c = −1/K, while the decoupling
of z (t) requires that b = (ad− bc)K, in addition to that
controller K (s) is chosen among static output-feedback sta-
bilizing controllers, i.e., K (s) = K ∈ R, in both cases. That
is to say, if w (t) and z (t) are to be decoupled simultaneously,
then b = (ad− bc)K = adK− bcK = adK+ b, which leads
to adK = 0 and contradicts the fact ad 6= 0 and K 6= 0
(otherwise the transfer function from reference R (s) to plant
input/output, see the proof of Theorem 3, will be zero).
As a matter of fact, it can be shown more generally that
even with dynamic two-way coding[
a (s) b (s)
c (s) d (s)
]
,
simultaneous decoupling of attack w (t) and attack z (t) is not
possible.
This “impossibility theorem” characterizes on a fundamen-
tal level why double-point attacks are in general more difficult
to defend against than single-point attacks. We will, however,
leave the discussions on the defense against such double-point
attacks to future research.
One final remark would be that some of the previous results
and discussions apply as well to disturbance decoupling. In
particular, it is known from Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 that
therein disturbance decoupling is not possible without coding
or with one-way coding, but it can be achieved with two-
way coding as shown in Theorem 3. Additionally, it follows
from Theorem 4 that therein disturbance decoupling cannot be
achieved in the uplink and downlink channels simultaneously
even with two-way coding.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have introduced the method of two-
way coding from communication into control, in particular,
feedback control systems under injection attacks. Additionally,
we have proposed the notion of attack decoupling, and it
was seen that the controller and two-way coding can be co-
designed to nullify the transfer function from attack to plant,
zeroing the attack effect completely both in transient phase and
in steady state. Future research directions include the analysis
of dynamic two-way coding, MIMO systems, discrete-time
systems, as well as other classes of attacks in the presence
of two-way coding. We are also interested in examining the
implications of attack decoupling in communication system
design, concerning, e.g., error correction.
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